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1Optimization or Alignment: Secure Primary
Transmission Assisted by Secondary Networks
Yang Cao, Student Member, IEEE, Nan Zhao, Senior Member, IEEE, F. Richard Yu, Fellow, IEEE,
Minglu Jin, Member, IEEE, Yunfei Chen, Senior Member, IEEE, Jie Tang, Member, IEEE
and Victor C.M. Leung, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Security is a challenging issue for cognitive radio
(CR) to be used in future 5G mobile systems. Conventionally,
interference will degrade the performance of a primary user
(PU) when the spectrum is shared with secondary users (SUs).
However, when properly designed, SUs can serve as friendly
jammers to guarantee the secure transmission of PU. Thus,
in this paper, we propose two schemes to improve the sum
rate of SUs while guaranteeing the secrecy rate of PU. In the
first scheme, the secondary transceivers are jointly designed to
maximize their sum rate while satisfying a threshold on the PU’s
secrecy rate. Due to the non-convex nature, it is first converted
into a convex one and then, an alternating optimization algorithm
based on the second-order cone programming is proposed to
solve it. In the second scheme, the principle of interference
alignment is employed to eliminate interference from PU and
other SUs at each secondary receiver, and the interference from
SUs is zero-forced at the primary receiver. Thus, interference-free
transmission can be performed by the legitimate CR network,
with eavesdropping towards PU disrupted by SUs. The key
features and performances of the two proposed schemes are
also compared. Finally, simulation results are presented to verify
the effectiveness of the two proposed schemes for secure CR
networks.
Index Terms—Cognitive radio, interference alignment, phys-
ical layer security, second-order cone programming, optimal
transceiver design, zero-forcing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the research on 5G mobile systems is emerging
as a hot topic. To satisfy the explosive growth of data traffic
and provide a better quality of service (QoS) for mobile
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users, challenging requirements are imposed on the future
5G networks for system capacity and transmission rate [2],
which can be relieved by improving the spectrum utilization
of mobile systems. To this end, cognitive radio (CR) has been
regarded as a promising technique for 5G, to fully utilize the
spectrum via spectrum sharing [3], [4]. In CR networks, using
its capability of sensing and adapting to the surrounding radio
environment, dynamic spectrum allocation can be realized
between the primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs)
to enhance spectrum efficiency [5], [6]. This is significant for
the bandwidth-hungry 5G.
Despite the enhancement of spectrum efficiency via CR,
secure transmission becomes a challenging issue due to the
inherent characteristics of CR networks and the open nature of
wireless channels [7], [8]. Particularly, potential eavesdroppers
in the CR network can severely compromise its security, which
can be deemed as illegal users who intend to wiretap the con-
fidential information transmitted by PUs [7]. The conventional
methods to combat with the eavesdropping rely on the cryp-
tography of the upper layer [9], which might not be trustable
due to the solvability of secret keys and the unavailability
of a trusted key management center [10]. Therefore, a novel
alternative security mechanism, physical layer security, has
emerged, and the secure transmission of confidential message
can be achieved using the physical characteristics of wireless
channels [11]. To this end, the pioneering study by Wyner
[12] demonstrated that nearly perfect secure communication
is possible in degraded broadcast channels without secret keys
considered. Following Wyner’s research, considerable efforts
have been dedicated to improve the secure transmission at
physical layer in the past decade, including node beamforming
and jamming optimization [13], [14], node cooperation [15],
relay selection [16], [17], artificial noise [18], [19], etc. In
addition, the interference between legitimate users can also
disrupt the potential eavesdropping effectively, if properly
managed, by using interference alignment (IA) technique [20]–
[22].
As for CR networks, several physical-layer methods have
also been conducted to guarantee the secure transmission
[23]–[29]. In [23], SU selection was proposed by Zhang et
al. through a coalition formation game model, to improve
PU’s secrecy capacity. In [24], Pei et al. investigated the
optimal transmitter design to achieve secure communication
in multiple-input single-output (MISO) CR network with
imperfect channel state information (CSI). In [25], Zou et
al. designed the optimal user scheduling in a multi-user
2multi-eavesdropper cognitive radio system, and the secrecy
outage and diversity were derived in the proposed scheduling
schemes, respectively. In [26], Al-Talabani et al. proposed to
leverage secondary transmitter as a trusted relay for PU to
improve its security. In [27], Xu et al. studied the secure trans-
mission in an underlay CR network with Poisson distributed
eavesdroppers, and presented four transmission protocols to
realize the security in terms of different CSI assumptions. In
[28], cooperative beamforming is designed by Zhu and Yao
to enhance security performance for both PUs and SUs in a
CR network with an eavesdropper. In [29], Fan et al. proposed
a relay selection scheme to improve the security of cognitive
relay network.
The key principle of CR networks is that SUs can only
access the licensed spectrum when they will not affect the
transmission of PU or can provide benefit. Thus, the secondary
transceivers can be jointly optimized to assist the secure trans-
mission of PU, which will generate more opportunities for SUs
to share the spectrum. On the other hand, IA is a promising
technique for interference management in wireless networks
[30]–[33], and it can also be exploited to guarantee the security
of CR networks. Thus, the idea of IA can also be leveraged
to perform interference-free transmission and improve the
secrecy rate of PU. In this paper, two effective schemes based
on transceiver design and IA are proposed, respectively. Both
schemes aim to guarantee the secure transmission of PU in
CR networks. The key motivations and contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows.
 In CR networks, opportunities are provided for SUs to
access spectrum only if they will not degrade the trans-
mission of PU. Following this basic principle, the SUs
are proposed to assist PU to achieve secure transmission
in this paper, in order to have more opportunities to share
the spectrum.
 Interference from SUs can be exploited to disrupt eaves-
dropping in this paper. There are two main methods
to achieve interference management in multiuser MIMO
networks, i.e., optimal transceiver design (OTD) and IA.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research
that adopts these two methods to guarantee the secure
transmission of PU in CR networks.
 In the proposed OTD scheme, the transceiver beamform-
ing is designed to maximize the sum rate of SUs, with the
threshold of PU’s secrecy rate satisfied. Due to the non-
convex nature of the optimization, we first transform it
into a convex one via convex approximation, and then, an
alternating optimization algorithm based on the second-
order cone programming (SOCPAO) is proposed to obtain
the solutions.
 In the IA-based scheme, the interference from PU and
other SUs is aligned and eliminated at each secondary re-
ceiver by exploiting IA, and meanwhile, the interference
from all the SUs are zero-forced at the primary receiv-
er. Thus, interference-free transmission can be achieved
by the legitimate PU and SUs, with the eavesdropping
towards PU disrupted by the signal from SUs.
 The proposed two schemes have their own features, which
Fig. 1. System model of the CR network with an eavesdropper.
are compared in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the system model is presented, followed by the problem
formulation. The OTD scheme is proposed in Section III, and
an SOCPAO algorithm is developed to obtain its solutions. In
Section IV, the IA-based scheme is proposed to eliminate or
zero-force the interference between legitimate users with the
secrecy rate of PU improved. In Section V, the key features
of these two schemes are compared. Simulation results are
presented in Section VI, and the conclusions and future work
are provided in Section VII.
Notation: IN represents the N  N identity matrix. Ay is
the Hermitian transpose of matrix A. kak is the Euclidean
norm of vector a, and kAk means the Frobenius norm of
matrix A. CMN is the space of complex M  N matrices.
CN (a;A) is the complex Gaussian distribution with mean a
and covariance matrix A. A  0 means that A is a Hermitian
positive semidefinite matrix. 0MN denotes an M N zero
matrix. Re() defines the real operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the system model of the
CR network with an eavesdropper, and then the problem of
transceiver beamforming design is formulated.
A. System Model
Consider a CR network with one PU, one malicious
eavesdropper and K trustable SUs, as shown in Fig. 1.
Let K denote the set of the indices of all the SUs, i.e.,
k 2 K , f1; 2; : : : ;Kg. We assume that both the PU and
the eavesdropper are equipped with a single antenna1, while
1The proposed schemes can be easily extended to the case of a single multi-
antenna eavesdropper or several eavesdroppers, although more antennas need
to be equipped at SUs to guarantee the performance, which is beyond the
scope of this paper.
3M [k] and N [k] antennas are equipped at the kth secondary
transmitter and receiver, respectively. To improve the spectrum
efficiency, we assume that the underlay model is used for
spectrum sharing between PU and SUs, which means that the
SUs can always access the spectrum as long as the interference
from SUs is acceptable.
The decoded signal at the kth secondary receiver is
y
[k]
d =u
[k]yH[kk]v[k]x[k]s +
KX
j=1;j 6=k
u[k]yH[kj]v[j]x[j]s
+ u[k]yh[k]spxp + u
[k]yn[k]s ;
(1)
where v[k] 2 CM [k]1 and u[k] 2 CN [k]1 are the precod-
ing and decoding vectors of the kth SU, respectively, withv[k]2 = P [k] and u[k]2 = 1. H[kj] 2 CN [k]M [j] denotes
the channel matrix from the jth secondary transmitter to the
kth secondary receiver, each entity of which is independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) and follows CN (0; 1). Sim-
ilarly, h[k]sp 2 CN
[k]1 is the channel vector from the primary
transmitter to the kth secondary receiver. n[k]s 2 CN [k]1
represents the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vector
with distribution CN (0; 2sIN [k]) at the kth secondary receiver.
x
[k]
s and xp denote the data streams transmitted by the kth
secondary transmitter and the primary receiver, respectively,
with
x[k]s 2 = 1 and jxpj2 = Pp. Then, the received signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the kth secondary
receiver can be calculated as
SINR[k]d =
u[k]yH[kk]v[k]2
KP
j=1;j 6=k
u[k]yH[kj]v[j]2+Pp u[k]yh[k]sp 2+2s : (2)
The received signal at the primary receiver can be denoted as
yp = hpxp +
KX
j=1
h[j]psv
[j]x[j]s + np; (3)
where hp is the channel gain of PU, and h[j]ps 2 C1M
[j]
represents the channel coefficient vector from jth secondary
transmitter to the primary receiver. np is the AWGN with zero
mean and 2p variance at the primary receiver. The received
SINR at the primary receiver can be expressed as
SINRp =
Pp jhpj2
KP
j=1
h[j]psv[j]2 + 2p : (4)
For the eavesdropper, its wiretapped signal from the PU can
be expressed as
ye = hepxp +
KX
j=1
h[j]esv
[j]x[j]s + ne; (5)
where hep denotes the channel gain from the primary trans-
mitter to the eavesdropper, and h[j]es 2 C1M
[j]
is the channel
coefficient vector from jth secondary transmitter to the eaves-
dropper. ne is the AWGN with zero mean and 2e variance at
the eavesdropper. Similar to the PU, the received SINR at the
eavesdropper can be denoted as
SINRe =
Pp jhepj2
KP
j=1
h[j]esv[j]2 + 2e : (6)
B. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we aim to maximize the sum rate of sec-
ondary network by optimizing their transceiver design, with
the requirement of PU’s secrecy rate satisfied. According to
(2), the transmission rate of the kth SU can be denoted as
R
[k]
D = log2

1 + SINR[k]d

: (7)
Based on (4) and (6), the achievable secrecy rate of PU can
be obtained as [34], [35]
Rs = [log2 (1 + SINRp)  log2 (1 + SINRe)]+ ; (8)
where [x]+ , max(x; 0).
In the underlay CR network, the SUs can access the network
only when the performance of PU is guaranteed. In this paper,
the security metric is adopted for the PU, and to achieve
the requirement, we intend to optimize the sum rate of SUs
provided that the secure transmission of PU can be satisfied.
In other words, the secrecy rate of PU should be guaranteed to
be no less than a given threshold with the help of SUs. Thus,
the optimization problem can be expressed as
max
u[k];v[k]
XK
k=1
R
[k]
D (9a)
s:t: Rs  rs; (9b)XK
k=1
v[k]2  PS ; (9c)u[k]2 = 1; 8k; (9d)
where rs is the secrecy rate threshold of PU, and PS de-
notes the constraint of the total transmit power of all the
secondary transmitters. It’s worth noting that the CSI of the
eavesdropper should be available in the legitimate network.
This is reasonable in situations where the eavesdroppers serve
as registered users of the network, but they cannot participate
in the transmission of the confidential information. The same
hypotheses have also been adopted in many existing works
[36]–[38].
From the problem (9), we can see that (9a) is non-convex in
that the variables u[k] and v[k] are coupled, and the constraint
for secrecy rate is not convex as well, due to the difference
of two quadratical logarithmic functions. Therefore, (9) is
non-convex and its global optimum is difficult to achieve.
In Section III, we will transform (9) into a convex problem
through convex approximation, and obtain its optimal solution
through an effective alternating optimization algorithm.
III. OPTIMAL TRANSCEIVER DESIGN SCHEME
In this section, we propose an alternating optimization
algorithm to calculate the optimal solutions to (9) in the OTD
scheme with two steps.
4A. Step One: Optimization of v[k]
First, we generate random variates of u[k] that satisfyu[k]2 = 1, k = 1; 2; : : : ;K. Then, (9) can be reduced to
max
v[k]
XK
k=1
R
[k]
D (10a)
s:t: Rs  rs; (10b)XK
k=1
v[k]2  PS : (10c)
It’s worth noting that (10) is still non-convex in its current
form, and we can reformulate it as follows through introducing
some auxiliary variables.
max
v[k];sk;m;n
XK
k=1
log2(sk) (11a)
s:t:
u[k]yH[kk]v[k]2
KP
j=1;j 6=k
u[k]yH[kj]v[j]2+Ppu[k]yh[k]sp2+2ssk 1; (11b)
Pp jhpj2PK
j=1
h[j]psv[j]2 + 2p  m  1; (11c)
1 +
Pp jhepj2PK
j=1
h[j]esv[j]2 + 2e 
1
n
; (11d)
log2(m)  log2(
1
n
)  rs; (11e)XK
k=1
v[k]2  PS : (11f)
Obviously, (11) is equivalent to
max
v[k];sk;m;n
KY
k=1
sk (12a)
s:t:
XK
j=1;j 6=k
u[k]yH[kj]v[j]2+Pp u[k]yh[k]sp 2+2s

u[k]yH[kk]v[k]2
sk   1 ;
(12b)
XK
j=1
h[j]psv[j]2 + 2p  Pp jhpj2m  1 ; (12c)XK
j=1
h[j]esv[j]2 + Pp jhepj2 + 2e

PK
j=1
h[j]esv[j]2 + 2e
n
;
(12d)
m n  2rs ; (12e)XK
k=1
v[k]2  PS : (12f)
From (12), we can see that the constraints (12b), (12c)
and (12d) are all non-convex in the form of g1(x)  g2(x).
This is due to the fact that both g1(x) and g2(x) are convex
and the difference of the two convex functions is nonconvex,
i.e., the left side of the inequality g1(x)   g2(x)  0 is
not convex. However, in terms of the constrained concave
convex procedure in [39], the functions of the right side in
the constraints (12b), (12c) and (12d) can be approximated
by their corresponding first-order Taylor expansion, and then,
we can convert these constraints into convex ones. Before
performing the conversion, we introduce Lemma 1 as follows.
Lemma 1: Define the quadratic-over-linear function as
F (y; x) =
ayyyya
x  c ; (13)
where c is a constant and x > c. A = aay  0 and Y = yyy 
0. The first-order Taylor expansion of the convex function (13)
can be derived as
<(y; x; y; x) = 2Re(y
yaayy)
x  c  
yyaayy
(x  c)2 (x  c) : (14)
For the convex function (13), it satisfies the inequality
F (y; x)  <(y; x; y; x).
Proof: F (y; x) is a function of two variables, and its first-
order Taylor expansion can be calculated as
<(y; x; y; x)=F (y; x)+@xF j(y;x)(x x)+@yF j(y;x)(y y)
=
ayyyya
x c  
ayyyya
(x c)2 (x x)+
2yyaay
x c (y y) :
(15)
Using ayyyya = yyaayy, the above expression can be simpli-
fied as
<(y; x; y; x) = 2y
yaayy
x  c  
yyaayy
(x  c)2 (x  c) : (16)
For convenience, the term yyaayy can be prudently approx-
imated with Re(yyaayy), and finally the first-order Taylor
expansion of function (13) can be expressed as
<(y; x; y; x) = 2Re(y
yaayy)
x  c  
yyaayy
(x  c)2 (x  c) : (17)
Note that the above approximation will not affect the feasibil-
ity of the original problem due to the fact that Re(yyaayy) yyaayy for a complex number.
Using the first-order convexity condition, we can obtain
F (y; x)  <(y; x; y; x), i.e., the first-order Tayor approxima-
tion is a global lower bound of the initial convex function.
Thus, Lemma 1 is proved.
According to Lemma 1, for the constraints (12b), (12c) and
(12d), we define
F1(v[k]; sk) =
u[k]yH[kk]v[k]v[k]yH[kk]yu[k]
sk   1 ; (18)
F2(m) =
Pp jhpj2
m  1 ; (19)
F3(v[k]; n) =
KP
j=1
h[j]esv[j]v[j]yh
[j]y
es + 
2
e
n
: (20)
The first-order Taylor approximation of (18) at a certain point
(v[k], sk) can be expressed as
<1(v[k]; sk; v[k]; sk) =2Re(v
[k]yb[k]b[k]yv[k])
sk   1
  v
[k]yb[k]b[k]yv[k]
(sk   1)2 (sk   1) ;
(21)
5where b[k] = H[kk]yu[k]. Similarly, the approximate expression
for (20) at a certain point (v[k], n) can be expressed as
<2(v[j]; n; v[j];n) =
2
KP
j=1
Re(v[j]yh[j]yes h
[j]
esv[j])
n
 
KP
j=1
v[j]yh[j]yes h
[j]
esv[j]
n2
n+
2e
n2
(2n  n) :
(22)
Moreover, the first-order Taylor expansion for (19) at a certain
point ( m) can be denoted as
<3(m; m) = Pp jhpj
2
m  1  
Pp jhpj2
( m  1)2 (m  m) : (23)
Based on the above approximations, we can substitute the
lower bounds in (21), (22) and (23) for the right side of the
constraints (12b), (12d) and (12c), respectively, and then, all
the constraints can be formulated as convex ones. Furthermore,
note that the objective function (12a) is formulated as a
product of sk, which can be transformed into a form of
second-order cone programming (SOCP) in order to reduce
the computational complexity. To this end, we first recall the
following lemma in [40].
Lemma 2: The hyperbolic constraints of the convex prob-
lem can be cast as SOCPs utilizing the following fact. w2 
xy; x  0; y  0() k[2w; x  y]yk  x+ y:
Therefore, in terms of Lemma 2, we can recast (12a) into a
sequence of second-order cone (SOC) constraints (24a)-(24d).
In addition, it is obvious that the constraint (12e) can be
transformed as (24h) in the same way. Consequently, with all
the transformations above, we can reformulate the problem in
(12) into a SOCP problem, which is expressed as (24) at the
top of the next page. In (24),  1k,  2 and  3 can be denoted
as follows, respectively,
 1k = <1(v[k]; sk; v[k]; sk) Pp
u[k]yh[k]sp 2 2s ; (25)
 2 = <2(v[j]; n; v[j]; n)  Ppjhepj2   2e ; (26)
 3 = <3(m; m)  2p: (27)
In (24b), C = dlog2Ke, where d:e is the ceiling function,
and we define sj = 1 for the case K < 2C , where j =
K + 1; : : : ; 2dlog2Ke
	
. Then, set (v[k]; sk; m; n) as the initial
values. The solution to the SOCP problem (24) can be obtained
by utilizing existing toolboxes, such as CVX in [41].
Remark: The optimal solution of (24) is not equivalent to
that of problem (10), due to the approximate transformations
that we adopt above. Specifically, the idea of successive
approximations presented in [42] is leveraged in the above
conversions, which means that we can only get a feasible
solution of v[k] by solving (24) in each iteration, while an op-
timal solution v[k] can be achieved by updating the variables
involved until convergence. Thus, an iterative algorithm needs
to be proposed to obtain the optimal solutions of problem (10),
and the approximations are compact when it is convergent.
B. Step Two: Optimization of u[k]
In this step, we will fix v[k] and optimize u[k]. When v[k]
is fixed, problem (9) can be reduced to
max
u[k]
KX
k=1
R
[k]
D
s:t:
u[k]2 = 1; 8k:
(28)
We can decompose (28) into K feasible subproblems, i.e., the
kth subproblem corresponding to the kth secondary receiver
can be written as
max
u[k]
R
[k]
D
s:t:
u[k]2 = 1; 8k: (29)
It can be seen that the subproblem (29) is equivalent to the
problem that maximize SINR[k]d with respect to u
[k], which
can be expressed as
SINR[k]d =
u[k]yH[kk]v[k]v[k]yH[kk]yu[k]
u[k]yQ[k]u[k]
; 8k; (30)
where Q[k] =
PK
j 6=kH
[kj]v[j]v[j]yH[kj]y+Pph[k]sph
[k]y
sp +
2
sI
[k]
N .
Then, the optimal solution of u[k] that maximizes SINR[k]d can
be derived as
u[k] =
(Q[k]) 1H[kk]v[k](Q[k]) 1H[kk]v[k] : (31)
C. Proposed SOCPAO Algorithm
With all the above derivations done, we propose an alter-
nating iterative optimization algorithm based on the SOCP
problem to obtain the optimal solution to (9) in the OTD
scheme, which is also denoted the SOCPAO algorithm. Details
of the SOCPAO algorithm are summarized as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 SOCPAO Algorithm
1: Initialization: Set the maximum number of iterations T ,
and randomly generate feasible values (v[k]; sk; m; n) for
the problem (24). Fix u[k] satisfying ku[k]k2 = 1.
2: Repeat
3: Solve the SOCP problem (24) by CVX, and obtain the
solutions (v[k]; sk;m; n).
4: Calculate (31) with v[k] and obtain u[k].
5: Update (v[k]; sk; m; n; u[k]) = (v[k]; sk;m; n; u[k]).
6: t = t+ 1.
7: Until t = T .
8: Output: v[k] and u[k];8k.
Note that, according to [39], Algorithm 1 is convergent.
Specifically, at each iteration, the value of t(0) will be larger
than or equal to its value in the previous iteration, which
reveals that the transmission rate will be monotonically in-
creasing or nondecreasing as the iteration proceeds. Besides,
there also exists an upper bound for the transmission rate
owing to the limited transmit power of each SU. Thus, the
6max
v[k];sk;m;n
t(0) (24a)
s:t:
h2t(C 1)i ; (s2i 1   s2i)iy  s2i 1 + s2i; i = 1; 2; :::; 2C 1; (24b)h2t(C 2)i ;t(C 1)2i 1   t(C 1)2i iy  t(C 1)2i 1 + t(C 1)2i ; i = 1; 2; :::; 2C 2; (24c)
     h2t(0);t(1)1   t(1)2 iy  t(1)1 + t(1)2 ; i = 1; (24d)h2v[1]yH[k1]yu[k]; : : : ; 2v[j]yH[kj]yu[k]; : : : ; 2v[K]yH[kK]yu[k]; 1k   1iy   1k + 1; j 6= k; j; k 2 K; (24e)h2v[1]yh[1]yes ; : : : ; 2v[K]yh[K]yes ; 2   1iy   2 + 1; (24f)h2v[1]yh[1]yps ; : : : ; 2v[K]yh[K]yps ; 3   1iy   3 + 1; (24g)h2p2rs ; (m  n)iy  m+ n; (24h)hv[1]y; v[2]y : : : ; v[K]yiy pPS ; 8k: (24i)
convergence of Algorithm 1 can be ensured, and we can
always obtain a local optimal solution to (9) or even a
global optimal solution if proper initial values are selected.
Nevertheless, the global optimal solution to (9) cannot always
be guaranteed due to its non-convexity.
IV. INTERFERENCE ALIGNMENT BASED SCHEME
In Section III, the OTD scheme is proposed to maximize the
sum rate of SUs with PU’s secure transmission guaranteed,
by solving (9) using the SOCPAO algorithm. Nevertheless,
the computational complexity of SOCPAO algorithm is high.
Furthermore, the CSI of eavesdropper may not be available in
some scenarios. Therefore, in this section, the idea of IA is
exploited to guarantee the interference-free transmission of the
CR network, with the eavesdropping towards PU disrupted by
the interference from SUs. To achieve the IA-based scheme,
some requirements should be satisfied as follows:
 The interference from other SUs should be constrained
into the same subspace as that from the PU at each
secondary receiver, which can be perfectly eliminated.
 The interference from SUs should be zero-forced at the
primary receiver, i.e., no residual interference will be
imposed on the PU.
When the above two requirements can be met, the legitimate
CR network can perform transmission without interference,
and the potential eavesdropping toward PU can also be dis-
rupted. In this case, the most important issue is the feasibility
condition, based on which we can know at least how many
antennas should be equipped at each secondary transceiver
to make the interference completely mitigated. Thus, in this
section, we first review the feasibility condition of IA, and
then, derive the feasibility condition for the proposed IA-based
scheme. Finally, we design an iterative algorithm to obtain the
solutions of the scheme.
A. Feasibility Condition of Interference Alignment
IA is a promising technique for interference management in
wireless networks. Its main idea is to restrict the interference
into the same subspace through cooperative precoding, and
then, eliminate the interference and recover the desired signal
with the decoding matrix at each receiver. To this end, the
following conditions should be satisfied to achieve IA.
U[k]yH[kj]V[j] = 0d[k]d[j] ; 8j 6= k; j; k 2 K; (32)
rank

U[k]yH[kk]V[k]

= d[k]; k 2 K; (33)
where V[k] 2 CM [k]d[k] and U[k] 2 CN [k]d[k] are the unitary
precoding and decoding matrices for d[k] data streams of the
kth user, respectively. With (32) satisfied, the interference
between users can be removed perfectly.
Furthermore, the feasibility condition of (32) has been
derived based on Bezout’s theorem in [43]. Specifically, (32)
can be deemed as a multivariate polynomial system, which can
be solved only if the number of equations is not larger than
the number of variables. Therefore, a given IA-based MIMO
network can be identified as feasible or infeasible using the
relationship between the number of variables and equations.
Before considering the CR network with an eavesdropper, we
first recall some conclusions in [43] as Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: The number of equations in (32) can be ex-
pressed as
N" =
X
j 6=k;j;k2K
d[k]d[j]: (34)
7The number of variables in (32) can be calculated as
N =
KX
k=1
d[k]

M [k] +N [k]   2d[k]

: (35)
Consequently, a symmetric IA-based MIMO network is feasi-
ble if and only if N  N".
Specially, we assume that all the users have the same
parameters due to the symmetry of IA networks, i.e., M [k] =
M;N [k] = N; d[k] = d for all IA users. Then, the feasibility
condition can be denoted as follows in terms of Lemma 3.
dK(M +N   2d)  d2K(K   1); (36)
which can be simplified as
M +N  d(K + 1): (37)
According to the degree of freedom (DoF) requirement of a
point-to-point MIMO channel, the value of M and N should
also satisfy M  d and N  d.
B. Feasibility Condition of the Proposed IA-Based Scheme
Consider the CR network with an eavesdropper, as demon-
strated in Section II. We aim to align and then eliminate
the interference from other SUs and PU at each secondary
receiver. Meanwhile, the interference from SUs is zero-forced
at the primary receiver to guarantee the interference-free
transmission of PU. Thus, the secure transmission of PU can
be achieved by disrupting the eavesdropper via the signals
from SUs. To achieve this goal, the following conditions
should be satisfied.
u[k]yH[kj]v[j] = 0; j 6= k; j; k 2 K; (38)
u[k]yh[k]sp = 0; k 2 K; (39)
h[j]psv
[j] = 0; j 2 K: (40)
With conditions (38) and (39) satisfied, the interference from
other SUs and PU can be perfectly eliminated at each sec-
ondary receiver. Moreover, the interference from SUs can be
zero-forced at the primary receiver when the condition (40)
is met. In addition, we assume that only one data stream
is transmitted by each SU, which is consistent with Section
III. Thus, the feasibility condition of the proposed IA-based
scheme can be derived in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The feasibility condition of the proposed IA-
based scheme for the CR network with an eavesdropper, can
be expressed as
M +N  K + 3;
M  2;
N  2:
(41)
Proof: The total number of variables in (38)-(40) can be
calculated as
N = K(M +N   2): (42)
The number of equations in (38) can be obtained as
N"1 = K(K   1): (43)
The number of equations in (39) can be expressed as
N"2 = K: (44)
Besides, the number of equations in (40) can be denoted as
N"3 = K: (45)
Therefore, according to Lemma 3, the following inequality
should be satisfied to make the proposed IA-based scheme
feasible.
N  N" = N"1 +N"2 +N"3; (46)
which can be simplified as
M +N  K + 3: (47)
Define N p" and N p as the total number of equations and the
total number of variables in (39), respectively. The problem
(39) can be solved if and only if
N p  N p" ) K(N   1)  K ) N  2: (48)
Similarly, define N s" and N s as the total number of equations
and the total number of variables in (40), respectively. The
problem (40) can be solved if and only if
N s  N s" ) K(M   1)  K )M  2: (49)
Based on the above analysis, we can obtain the feasibility
condition of the proposed IA-based scheme as (41).
From Theorem 1, we can conclude that 2 more antennas
should be added at each secondary pair in the proposed IA-
based scheme for secure CR network to make it feasible
(M + N  K + 3), compared to that in the conventional
IA network. In addition, at least 2 antennas should be added
at each secondary transceiver to make it feasible, and this
requirement is also higher than that in the conventional IA
network, which needs at least 1 antenna at each node when
d = 1.
C. Iterative Algorithm
With the feasibility condition derived in Theorem 1, we can
design an iterative algorithm to achieve the proposed IA-based
scheme, similar to the MinIL algorithm in [44].
For the forward direction, the interference covariance matrix
at the kth secondary receiver can be expressed as
Q[k] =
KX
j 6=k
P [j]H[kj]v[j]v[j]yH[kj]y + Pph[k]sph
[k]y
sp : (50)
Similarly, for the reverse direction, the interference covariance
matrix at the kth secondary transmitter can be denoted as
  
Q [k] =
KX
j 6=k
P [j]
  
H [kj]  v [j]  v [j]y  H [kj]y + P [k]h[k]psh[k]yps ; (51)
where
  
H [kj] = H[jk],   v [j] = u[k].
Therefore, the iterative process based on (50) and (51) can
be summarized as Algorithm 2, to obtain the precoding and
decoding vectors of SUs in the proposed IA-based scheme,
with conditions (38)-(40) satisfied.
8TABLE I
COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED TWO SCHEMES
CSI of Eavesdropper Performance Complexity Feasibility
OTD Scheme Required Higher sum rate Relatively High Unknown (verified by numerical methods)
IA-Based Scheme Not Required Higher secrecy rate Relatively Low M +N  K + 3;M  2; N  2
Algorithm 2 Iterative Algorithm for IA-Based Scheme
1: Begin with random M  1 vectors v[j] with v[j]v[j]y =
1; 8j 2 K.
2: Repeat
3: Compute the interference covariance matrix Q[k] based
on (50), k 2 K.
4: Obtain the decoding vector u[k] of the kth secondary
receiver as
u[k] = 
h
Q[k]
i
; k 2 K; (52)
where [A] denotes eigenvector corresponding to the small-
est eigenvalue of A.
5: Reverse the direction. Set   v [k] = u[k]; k 2 K.
6: Calculate
  
Q [k] according to (51), k 2 K.
7: Compute the reverse decoding vector   u [k] as
  u [k] = 
h  
Q [k]
i
; k 2 K: (53)
8: Reverse the direction and update the precoding vectors
as v[k] =  u [k]; k 2 K.
9: Until the maximum number of iterations is satisfied.
10: Output the solutions as v[k] and u[k], k 2 K.
With the proposed IA-based scheme for secure CR network,
the sum rate of SUs can be improved due to the fact that both
interferences from the PU and other SUs are eliminated at each
secondary receiver. In addition, the secrecy rate of PU can be
enhanced because the interference from SUs is zero-forced
at the primary receiver while the potential eavesdropping is
disrupted by the secondary signal.
V. COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED TWO SCHEMES
In Sections III and IV, the OTD scheme and the IA-based
scheme for secure CR network are proposed, respectively, both
of which aim to improve the sum rate of SUs with the secure
transmission of PU guaranteed. These two schemes have their
special features, which are compared as follows.
 CSI of Eavesdropper: In the OTD scheme, the CSI of
eavesdropper has to be known at legitimate SUs, which
may not be true in some scenarios. On the other hand,
the CSI of eavesdropper need not be available at the SUs
in the IA-based scheme. Thus, the IA-based scheme is
more useful than the OTD scheme in these scenarios.
 Performance: For the OTD scheme, the precoding and
decoding vectors are designed to achieve the highest
sum rate for SUs with the basic requirement of security
for PU. As for the IA-based scheme, no optimization is
performed. Instead, the interference between the legiti-
mate users can be perfectly eliminated or zero-forced.
Therefore, when the transmit power is high enough and
the antennas are adequate, the secrecy rate of PU is higher
in the IA-based scheme, while the sum rate of SUs is
higher in the OTD scheme.
 Complexity: To solve the non-convex problem (9) in the
OTD scheme, Algorithm 1 can be performed iteratively
utilizing CVX. In the IA-based scheme, the solutions can
be achieved via Algorithm 2 iteratively, whose computa-
tional complexity is a little lower than that of the OTD
scheme.
 Feasibility: For the problem in (9), we cannot obtain
any feasibility conditions like IA scheme. Instead, we
can only know whether it can be solved by numerical
methods, such as CVX. As for the IA-based scheme, its
feasibility condition can be derived as (41) in Theorem
1, i.e., only when the feasibility condition is met, the IA-
based scheme can be solved. Thus, the feasibility condi-
tion can provide the conclusion on the minimal number of
antennas to remove interference in the legitimate network,
which is also helpful to the OTD scheme.
To make it clear, we summarize them in Table I.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, extensive simulation results are presented to
evaluate the performances of the two proposed schemes. In
the simulation, we assume that 2p = 
2
s = 
2
e = 
2. All the
channels follow slow Rayleigh block fading.
First, to investigate the influence of rs on the performance
of the OTD scheme, the secrecy rate of PU and the sum rate
of SUs are compared for different values of rs in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3, respectively, where K = 3;M = 3; N = 3; 2 =
 20dBm, and three cases, PS = 25mW, PS = 15mW and
PS = 5mW, are considered. In Fig. 2, the secrecy rate of PU
is compared for different thresholds rs. From this figure, we
can observe that the secrecy rate of PU will increase with rs,
and we have Rs  rs for different values of PS . Thus, we
can conclude that the basic requirement of security for PU
can be guaranteed in the OTD scheme, which is consistent
with the objective function (9). In Fig. 3, the sum rate of SUs
is compared for different thresholds rs. From the result, we
can see that the sum rate of SUs decreases with rs. This is
due to the fact that SUs should sacrifice their performance to
guarantee higher security requirement of PU. In addition, the
sum rate of SUs will increase with higher PS , due to the fact
that higher transmit power will result in higher transmission
rate, if interference can be properly managed.
Then, the secrecy rate of PU and the transmission rate of an
individual SU in the IA-based scheme are compared in Fig. 4
and Fig. 5, with different number of antennas equipped at each
SU, when K = 3 and K = 4 are considered, respectively.
In this simulation, assume that Pp = 5mW and the transmit
power of each SU equals to 5mW, i.e., P [k] = 5mW. In Fig. 4,
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the secrecy rate of PU for the OTD scheme under
different thresholds of rs in a 3-user secondary network. Three cases of PS =
25mW, PS = 15mW and PS = 5mW are considered.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the sum rate of SUs for the OTD scheme under
different thresholds of rs in a 3-user secondary network. Three cases of PS =
25mW, PS = 15mW and PS = 5mW are considered.
the secrecy rate of PU with different values of 2 is compared.
From the result, we can see that, when the IA-based scheme
is feasible, i.e., M +N = 6  K + 3 = 6 or M +N = 7 
K + 3 = 7, the secrecy rate of PU grows linearly with the
decreasing noise power, due to the fact that the interference
from all the SUs has been zero-forced at the primary receiver.
However, when the IA-based scheme is not feasible, i.e., M+
N < 6 (K = 3) or M + N < 7 (K = 4), the secrecy
rate of PU will be much lower than that when it is feasible.
This is because the interference from the SUs will not be
eliminated, which will affect the transmission of PU. In Fig. 5,
the transmission rate of a certain SU with different values of 2
is compared. From the result, we can see that the transmission
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Fig. 4. Comparison of the secrecy rate of PU for the IA-based scheme with
different number of antennas equipped at each SU, when the noise power is
varying. K = 3 and K = 4 are considered, respectively.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
5
10
15
10*lg(1/σ2)
Tr
an
sm
iss
io
n 
Ra
te
 o
f a
 S
in
gl
e 
SU
 (B
its
\s\
Hz
)
 
 
M=4,N=3,K=4
M=3,N=3,K=4
M=3,N=3,K=3
M=2,N=3,K=3
Fig. 5. Comparison of the transmission rate of a certain SU for the IA-
based scheme with different number of antennas equipped at each SU, when
the noise power is varying. K = 3 and K = 4 are considered, respectively.
rate of a certain SU linearly increases as the channel noise
becomes smaller when the IA-based scheme is feasible. In
addition, we can see that the average transmission rate of each
user is close to others in different feasible cases. However,
when the IA-based scheme is not feasible, the transmission
rate of a certain SU becomes much lower than that when it is
feasible.
The secrecy rate of PU and the sum rate of SUs in the
proposed OTD and IA-based schemes is compared under
different thresholds of PS in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively.
Assume that rs = 3bits=s=Hz and 2 =  20dBm. From Fig.
6, we can see that the secrecy rate of PU is always fixed and
equal to that of the threshold rs in the OTD scheme, which is
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the sum rate of SUs for the OTD and IA-based
schemes with different thresholds of PS in a CR network with 3 SUs.
consistent with the objective function (9). On the other hand,
the secrecy rate of PU in the IA-based scheme is much higher
than that in the OTD scheme, when the feasibility condition
in Theorem 1 can be satisfied, i.e., M + N  K + 3 = 6,
and it will increase as PS becomes higher. However, when the
IA-based scheme is not feasible, the secrecy rate of the IA-
based scheme will become much worse than that in the OTD
scheme. From the result in Fig. 7, we can find that the sum
rate of SUs in the IA-based scheme is close to that in the OTD
scheme, when it is feasible, i.e., M + N = 6 = K + 3, and
will increase with higher PS . When the number of antennas
becomes larger than feasible, i.e., M + N > K + 3 = 6,
the sum rate of SUs in the IA-based scheme will not increase
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Fig. 8. Comparison of PU’s secrecy rate for the OTD and IA-based schemes
with different number of SUs. M = 4 and N = 3.
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the transmission rate of a certain SU for the OTD
and IA-based schemes with different number of SUs. M = 4 and N = 3.
any longer, while the sum rate of SUs in the OTD scheme
will still become higher. However, when the IA-based scheme
becomes infeasible, the sum rate of SUs of both schemes
will become much lower, especially the IA-based scheme, due
to the residual interference. Thus, we can conclude that the
simulation results in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 are consistent with the
analysis in Section V.
Finally, the secrecy rate of PU and the transmission rate of
a certain SU in the OTD and IA-based schemes are compared
in Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, respectively, with different number of
SUs. Assume that all the SUs are equipped with the equal
number of antennas, i.e., M = 4; N = 3. 2 =  20dBm,
rs = 3bits=s=Hz, and three cases, K = 3, K = 4 and K = 5
are considered. From the result in Fig. 8, we can see that the
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secrecy rate of PU is always equal to rs in the OTD scheme,
with different number of SUs and different values of PS , which
is consistent with the objective function (9). In the IA-based
scheme, the secrecy rate of PU will not changed with different
number of SUs, when it is feasible, which is much higher than
that in the OTD scheme. Besides, the secrecy rate of PU will
become higher with larger value of PS . However, when the
IA-based scheme is not feasible, the secrecy rate of PU in the
IA-based will become much worse, and will decrease with
higher PS , due to the fact that higher transmit power of SUs
will generate larger interference at the primary receiver. From
the result in Fig. 9, we can find that the transmission rate of
a certain SU in the OTD scheme is higher than that in the
IA-based scheme with the same number of antennas when it
is infeasible (M + N = 7 < K + 3) or more than feasible
(M +N = 7 > K + 3), due to the fact that the sum rate of
SUs is maximized with the secrecy of PU guaranteed in the
OTD scheme. When it is just exactly feasible, i.e., M +N =
7 = K + 3, the transmission rate of a single SU in these
two schemes is close to each other. Besides, the transmission
rate of a certain SU in the OTD scheme will decrease almost
linearly with the number of SUs increases, due to the fact that
more resource will be devoted to each SU when the number
of SUs is less in the OTD scheme. In the IA-based scheme,
the transmission rate of a certain SU will be almost stable and
unchanged with different number of SUs, when it is feasible.
However, the transmission rate of a certain SU will decrease
seriously when the IA-based scheme is infeasible, due to the
leaked interference.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed two schemes, i.e., OTD scheme
and IA-based scheme, to achieve secure transmission of PU
assisted by SUs in CR networks. In the OTD scheme, the
secondary transceivers are jointly designed to maximize the
sum rate of SUs with the secrecy rate of PU guaranteed. To
solve the problem, it is converted into a convex one, and an
SOCPAO algorithm is proposed to calculate the solutions. In
the IA-based scheme, IA is exploited to eliminate and zero-
force the interference at each SU and PU. Thus interference-
free transmission can be achieved by the legitimate CR net-
work, and the eavesdropping towards PU can be disrupted by
the signal from SUs effectively. The feasibility conditions of
the IA-based scheme are also derived. In addition, the key
features of these two schemes are compared, and plenty of
simulation results are presented to show their effectiveness. In
our future work, we will focus on the design of the schemes
in the case of a single multi-antenna eavesdropper or several
eavesdroppers, and the imperfect CSI problem will also be
considered.
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